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Abstract
To what extent should the child’s point of view be included when a political community endeavors to 
make just decisions, and why? Democrats are committed to a principle of political inclusion grounded 
in equal respect for persons. Yet we regularly deny children the right to vote and we often just assume 
that the citizens doing the hard work of democratic deliberation are adults. As I will show, electoral 
conceptions of democracy can plausibly reconcile this tension in a way that requires no serious 
adjustment to the principle of inclusion. However, I also argue that a similar reconciliation seems 
unavailable to deliberative conceptions of democracy, and this fact has implications for how delibera-
tive democrats should understand political inclusion and its relationship to the aims of schooling. I 
do this by providing a broad overview of deliberative conceptions of democracy, with a focus on some 
fundamental epistemic features of these conceptions, to explain why deliberative democrats must 
take a different approach. I then look at different arguments for children’s deliberative inclusion and 
propose an account of my own. Finally, I use this account in order to offer a different perspective on 
the aims of schooling under deliberative conceptions of democracy.
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Children’s Inclusion as a Philosophical Problem
To what extent should the child’s point of view be included when a political community endeavors to make just decisions, and why?1 The question of 
inclusion matters for democrats, who are in general committed to a 
principle of political inclusion grounded in equal respect for 
persons. However, the literature on voting rights has surfaced a 
1 For ease of writing I will use the terms child and children. But I have in 
mind here any minor, such as adolescents. Very young children are 
physically incapable or have not acquired even basic understandings. 
The child I therefore have in view is someone who can speak and act but 
is nonetheless denied rights of participation.
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tension between this principle and children (Fowler, 2014; Rehfeld, 
2011; Schrag, 1975, 1977, 2004). In brief, any argument for why 
children and adolescents should be excluded from voting also 
justifies the exclusion of adults on relevantly similar grounds. For 
example, if it is justifiable to exclude children because they lack 
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knowledge of their own political community, “lacking knowledge” 
becomes reasonable grounds for excluding anyone.2 Other 
arguments for exclusion— maturity, personal autonomy, and 
cognitive ability— encounter similar problems. It appears as if we 
are forced to conclude that the principle of inclusion is mistaken in 
some fundamental way or to concede that there is no reason why 
children should not— at least in principle— have an equal say in the 
democratic process. We can call this the generalization problem of 
children’s political inclusion.
At the same time, it is a widely held intuition that children’s 
political preferences— their views on certain questions of  
public policy, for example— should be treated with greater 
circumspection than the preferences of other citizens. Think of 
how we often treat children in other spheres. My son is interested 
in coin collecting. He has the rare opportunity to visit a coin shop, 
but this visit will conflict with his long- awaited doctor’s appoint-
ment. His preference is to go to the shop over the doctor. Knowing 
his preference shapes my action in certain respects. For example, I 
commit myself to visiting a coin shop with him in the future. But 
the purchase that his preference has on what we do is limited in 
important respects. I take him to the doctor even when his 
preference is to skip the appointment, and I do this because I am 
responsible for his well- being. A similar relationship seems to hold 
between adult and child citizens. It seems unreasonable to hold 
child citizens fully responsible for the consequences of their 
unformed and malleable preferences, including the potentially 
harmful public and political consequences that would arise if they 
were to have equal say on various matters. To be sure, some 
adolescents exhibit a high degree of knowledge and sophistication 
on some public issues. But even here, they are likely to change their 
views as they learn from experience. So, while we are willing to 
hear children out, and even allow their preferences to inform our 
own political decisions to some degree, we remain cautious about 
how much independent weight we are willing to assign to these 
preferences. We can all call this the circumspection problem of 
children’s political inclusion.
The generalization and circumspection problems point to a 
tension within the democratic ideal. On the one hand, circumspec-
tion is a powerful intuition. We deny children the right to vote and 
we often just assume that the citizens doing the hard work of 
deliberation are adults. On the other hand, any grounds we might 
proffer for justifying our intuitions about circumspection, if 
generalized, commit us to the view that some adults should not be 
allowed to vote or that citizens must meet some proffered standard 
of competence before they should be included in deliberation. As I 
show, electoral conceptions of democracy can plausibly reconcile 
the tension in a way that requires no serious adjustment to the 
democratic principle of inclusion. I also argue that a similar 
2 One might argue that adults have acquired a status, such as “citizen,” that 
children do not have and that this status makes arguments about 
competence inapplicable to adults. However, this fails to explain why 
adults (and not children) should have this status in the first place, for 
reasons that do not ultimately appeal to competence criteria such as 
knowledge, maturity, or autonomy.
reconciliation seems unavailable to deliberative conceptions of 
democracy, and this fact has implications for how deliberative 
democrats should understand inclusion and its role in our political 
institutions.
In the first section, I explain how electoral conceptions of 
democracy can address children’s inclusion by rethinking the 
nature and scope of voting practices. In the second, I provide a 
broad overview of deliberative conceptions of democracy, with a 
focus on some fundamental epistemic features of these concep-
tions, to explain why deliberative democrats must take a different 
approach. In the third section, I look at different arguments for 
children’s deliberative inclusion in the literature, and I propose an 
account of my own. In the fourth section, I use this account in 
order to offer a different perspective on the aims of schooling 
under deliberative conceptions of democracy.
Children’s Inclusion in the Electoral Democratic Order
All democratic societies place age restrictions on voting. Yet 
democracy is a fundamentally inclusive form of governance. This 
theory/practice disjuncture has led political philosophers to ask  
if the exclusion of children is a legitimate policy or a failure of 
democratic principle. For example, Schrag (2004) argues that  
the exclusion of children cannot be an ad hoc addition to the 
inclusive rule but something that follows from our understanding 
of the nature of political inclusion itself. Accordingly, arguments 
for children’s exclusion cannot be self- defeating; that is, they 
cannot establish a precedent that, if applied generally, would 
contradict the principle of inclusion.
There is little evidence that such arguments are available to us. 
Philosophers and political theorists have struggled to identify just 
what, if anything, sets children apart from adults in the democratic 
order. They have advanced several proposals, usually developmen-
tal in nature: that is, that citizens must pass a certain threshold of 
maturation or development before being granted voting rights. 
These proposals range from Kantian autonomy (Shapiro, 1999), 
Rawls’s (1996) two moral powers (Coleman, 2002), and Kholber-
gian stage theory (Christiano, 2001). None solve the consistency 
problem, for in practice, adults from all walks of life fall short of the 
ideal. Christiano (2001), for example, argued that children should 
be cut out of the franchise because they are “not capable of 
elaborating or reflecting on moral principles; they adopt moral 
ideas from their parents not out of a sense of conviction but out of 
desire to please and a sense of trust in their parents. For the same 
reasons, children do not have a developed sense of their own 
interests.” (p. 207). Yet these reasons apply to many adults as well 
(see Schrag, 2004, p. 371).
The tension between democratic principle and practice leads 
Schrag (1975, 2004) to advocate for what I call the practice- based 
approach to children’s democratic inclusion. Schrag argues that the 
theoretical problem— that any attempt to justify why children 
should not be included seems to contradict our democratic 
commitments— is itself misconceived. There simply are no 
theoretical reasons for excluding children. Young children and 
adolescents should in principle equally participate in the demo-
cratic order. But how best to include them is a question whose 
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answer turns on establishing political practices most appropriate, 
given their ability and competence (Schrag, 2004, p. 378).
The appeal of the practice- based approach is that introduces a 
helpful distinction between the means of inclusion and the end of 
inclusion. Under the electoral conception, the basis of social choice 
is an aggregation of preferences, where an inclusive choice is one in 
which everyone’s preference informs the decision with the majority 
preference ruling (Elster, 1997). If true, it is the public expression of 
the preference that counts, not voting per se. That is to say, voting is 
a practice that enables the public accounting of preferences, with its 
universal practice satisfying the inclusive end. Because voting is 
here understood as a means to inclusion and not an end in itself, we 
can problematize children’s inclusion differently. Circumspection 
doesn’t have to mean that children should not be included; rather, 
it can mean that the practice of voting is an unreliable means of 
including children’s preferences in political decision- making. 
Children have difficulty understanding how their preferences align 
with what’s on the ballot, for example, or they are not fully aware of 
the long- term consequences if their expressed preferences were to 
be fully counted in the decision- making process.
We expect adult voters to vote as an individual and without 
cognitive or other forms of assistance. Children seem unable to do 
this. When we see unassisted voting and the counting of prefer-
ences as one and the same, it seems as through the simplest 
solution is to defer the child’s right to vote until they pass some 
threshold point. But once we distinguish the ideal of inclusion (the 
counting of everyone’s preferences) from the means of inclusion 
(the practice of voting), the electoral state has some latitude to play 
with. It can modify the practice of voting to ensure that the child’s 
preferences register in ways that are meaningful for the political 
decision- making process while also taking into account the level of 
circumspection adults should reasonably take with respect to such 
preferences.
Practices of this kind are by no means far- fetched. We can look 
to contemporary examples for inspiration. There have been a variety 
of proposed voting mechanisms for including children’s preferences, 
such as extra proxy votes for parents or fractional votes for young 
voters (Rehfeld, 2011, p. 158). These approaches suggest that the 
“normal” way that preferences are publicly expressed in the electoral 
state (one individual citizen, one unassisted vote) can be altered to 
better fulfill the inclusive principle.
Proxy- voting for children might be justified on inclusive 
grounds. We could argue, for example, that voting for children 
ensures that their preferences are counted when they were not 
before. However, one might object that these and similar practices 
still run afoul of the generalization problem. This is because the 
justification of a proxy must appeal to reasons that explain why  
the child is assigned a proxy vote and not an unrestricted right to 
vote on their own. These reasons, we can be sure, will appeal to 
premises about circumspection. But if we say that children are 
entitled to a proxy vote but no more, for circumspect reasons, it 
follows that relevantly similar adults are entitled to a proxy vote 
(but no more).
Yet the practice- based approach has still more to offer. 
Suppose a society proposed that parents or guardians should act as 
electoral proxies for their children. Can this policy be justified 
without falling into the generalization trap? Much turns on the 
nature of the practice. For example, we can introduce a distinction 
between an expressive proxy and a trustee proxy. An expressive 
proxy is one who attempts to translate, or communicate, a prefer-
ence on behalf of another person who is unable to do so on his or 
her own. I can’t make the committee meeting, so I direct you to 
vote for me, knowing you know where my preference lies. A trustee 
proxy is one who is entrusted with expressing preferences that will 
benefit his or her client regardless of their client’s own preferences. 
I have never been to a meeting, so I ask that you vote for me, 
trusting that you will vote in a way that serves my best interests 
given that I do not understand the stakes involved.
Neither practice can be applied to children in general. This is 
because the justification of such practices has the form “because 
children lack some competence/maturity/knowledge condition X.” 
But whatever “condition X” is, it overreaches by capturing rel-
evantly similar adults within the same democratic community. For 
example, assigning a trustee proxy involves taking away someone’s 
right to express their own preference and replacing that expressive 
right with those of a more competent trustee. To deny such a right 
to a group of citizens, such as children, involves a judgment about 
that group’s ability in general to form “good” or “desirable” or 
“wise” preferences, a judgement that, due it it’s vagueness, can be 
applied to any individual outside the group who meets those same 
conditions. If we say that children in general should be assigned a 
trustee proxy, it would follow that any relevantly similar adult 
should also be assigned a trustee.
But let’s take the example of expressive voting and, instead of 
grounding our argument in claims about the competence of 
children in general, focus on aspects of the practice of voting that 
may impede their inclusion by virtue of the fact that those practices 
are not a good fit with the competence of some citizens. When 
parents act as expressive proxies, they endeavor to understand and 
interpret their child’s preferences and express them through a vote. 
As Elster puts it, “[p]references are never ‘given’ in the sense of 
being directly observable. If they are to serve as inputs to the social 
choice process, they must somehow be expressed by the individu-
als” (1997, p. 6). Accordingly, imagine a situation in which a local 
municipality is reviewing a proposal to clear out a green space for a 
condo development and decides to put the proposal to a public 
vote. Children in the local neighborhood often use that green space 
as a play area. On the expressive account, it would be a procedural 
requirement that children be informed of the proposal and what 
the implications are for the local area. Further, these children 
would each be given the opportunity to articulate their prefer-
ences, with assigned proxies casting the vote that best represents 
that preference.3 The practice of expressive proxy- voting does not 
3 This is a sketch of what this practice could look like. Various voting 
mechanisms could be developed for different contexts, decisions and 
levels of government. However, these mechanisms would have to be 
developed with a careful eye on their justification because the barriers to 
inclusion that are being addressed should not overreach or overgeneral-
ize in a way that could disenfranchise other citizens. In my example, 
children simply don’t know about the proposed development and, 
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establish a precedent that, if generally applied, would justify large 
numbers of adults having their vote taken away and replaced by 
proxies. And this is because the grounds for expressive proxy- 
voting are specific.
The practice of expressive proxy- voting ensures that a citizen’s 
preferences are counted when they are unable to publicly express 
such preferences on their own.4 By specifying what is getting in 
between a citizen and their inclusion, the practice of expressive 
proxy- voting can respond to a range of context- specific conditions 
under which it is would be appropriate to impose a proxy on 
citizens, conditions more likely to apply to children than adults. 
That is to say, the practice makes no generalizations about the 
competence or fitness of groups of citizens; rather, it identifies 
practical barriers to the expression of preferences and seeks to 
overcome them. Further, because the practice enables the expres-
sion of a preference where it was not, or could not, be expressed 
previously, the adoption of this practice in democratic society is 
rightly understood as a move closer to the end of inclusion.
It is important to emphasize that, according to the account 
that I have given, the practice of proxy- voting applies to any 
citizen that has serious difficulties expressing a preference on their 
own. Empirically speaking, the conditions that would have to 
obtain for an expressive proxy to be fairly applied would be more 
likely to occur in the case of children and less often in the case of 
adults. But we can imagine that some adults would be included 
within the expressive proxy framework; that is, we can find 
situations in which certain adults require support in the expression 
of their preferences. Being more flexible in our voting practices so 
that they can enable more citizens to express their own preferences 
does not establish a precedent for the exclusion of adults (or 
children); rather, it expands the inclusivity of the democratic 
principle.
In this way, generalization can refine our democratic practices 
by testing our assumptions about the competence of citizens 
against the implications of such assumptions for the (dis)enfran-
chisement of the population. Rather than argue that children fall 
short of some general competence threshold and exclude them, we 
start with the fact that some citizens (mostly children, but some 
adults too) happen to have various difficulties expressing their 
preferences in the public sphere, and guided by the democratic 
further, may not know how to match their preference with a yay or nay 
vote. The barrier establishes the nature and scope of the proxy interven-
tion, but no more. This would be different than an overreaching 
intervention, that is, one made on the grounds that children in general 
are “incompetent” or “lack maturity.” I thank the anonymous reviewer 
for encouraging me to clarify this point.
4 This does not mean that proxy votes are a good practical solution. For 
example, there is no guarantee that parents will respect these conditions 
and cast their votes based on a sincere effort understand their children’s 
preferences. Expressive proxy- voting assumes parents would be willing 
and able to vote out of respect for what they think their children’s 
expressed interests would be and not what they believe is in their child’s 
best interests regardless, and it also assumes that parents would not use 
the extra votes to advance their own interests. But then, no voting 
practice operates exactly as envisioned under ideal conditions.
principle of inclusion, we improve our practices in recognition of 
these difficulties.
Children’s Inclusion in the Deliberative Democratic Order
In the last section, I detailed how the electoral conception of 
democracy can in principle handle the tension between circum-
spection and generalization. It can do this by drawing a distinction 
between the means of inclusion (voting) and the end of inclusion 
(the counting of preferences). Of course, we can challenge, modify, 
or revise different aspects of this account while still recognizing the 
distinction. And it is the distinction that is important for my 
argument about deliberative inclusion, because this distinction 
appears to be unavailable to deliberative democrats, making the 
question of children’s deliberative inclusion a more intractable 
problem. Here is why:
Recall that the conception of social choice underlying 
electoral democracy makes it plausible to view children’s inclu-
sion as a problem of democratic practice. But deliberative 
democratic theory proffers a different conception, in which 
citizens engage in reason- giving as a means to public agreement. 
It takes the view that communicative efforts at mutual under-
standing and agreement should have an educative or transforma-
tive effect on the preferences of deliberators (Miller, 1992). That 
is, under the right conditions, it is possible for citizens to be 
convinced, without coercion or manipulation, of the merits of a 
policy or political decision in terms of that decision’s conse-
quences for the interests of all affected by that same policy or 
decision (Gutmann, 1999; Habermas, 1990). Accordingly, all 
affected by the observance of a proposed norm or policy should 
have an equal opportunity to challenge the merits of that pro-
posed norm. In short, agreement under conditions of inclusion, 
symmetry, and reciprocity are epistemic criteria of political 
decision- making (Okshevsky, 2016). Unlike electoral democracy, 
then, deliberative theories do not see a valid decision as some-
thing that can be inferred from, or traced back to, predeliberative 
preferences.
Deliberative democrats believe that their conception can 
mitigate the individualism and self- interest that can drive electoral 
decision- making. But this also means that it is more difficult to 
cache out children’s democratic participation in terms of the end of 
inclusion, on the one hand, and means of inclusion, on the other. 
For example, we might want to say that public agreement is the 
inclusive ideal, while reason- giving by all is the means to that 
inclusive ideal. However, reason- giving, or making independent 
claims about justice, is a constitutive feature of a valid norm or 
agreement and is not so easily scaled to an individual’s compe-
tence. I cannot give a fractional reason, for example. I either give 
reasons or I do not. This matters profoundly for deliberative 
inclusion. Consider that one way to understand the value of 
democratic deliberation is that it enhances the epistemic quality  
of political decisions made in the interests of justice and fairness. 
On this view, the inclusion of different viewpoints makes it more 
likely that a community of inquiry will discover the right answer, 
or if we take a more constructivist view of political justification, 
inclusion is part of what makes a decision right, valid, or 
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legitimate.5 In either case, the epistemic value of deliberation 
weighs strongly in favor of political inclusion in general. For, if 
successful political decisions reflect the interests of all affected by 
such decisions and, in a diverse society, we cannot know and 
understand all the interests and values of our fellow citizens we 
therefore have the epistemic principle of political inclusion: the 
likelihood that a political decision is successful increases as we 
include the perspectives of those affected in the decision- making 
procedure, either because (a) our chances of discovering a success-
ful decision are higher or (b) the decision is more likely to be 
constructed in such a way that it can be recognized by all affected 
as successful.6 I take various forms of the epistemic principle of 
inclusion to be implicit in most, if not all, conceptions of delibera-
tive democracy.
Given that questions of justice and fairness affect both 
children and adults, we can further make claim to the epistemic 
principle of children’s political inclusion: the inclusion of children is 
as epistemically valuable as the inclusion of any other constituency 
affected by a political decision.
However, there is an unacknowledged premise operating in 
the argument that requires us to rethink the epistemic principle of 
inclusion in either its general or its child- centred corollary: Any 
individual or group affected by a decision is more likely to make an 
epistemic contribution if his or her viewpoint is included in 
deliberation than if it is excluded. We can call this the contribution 
premise. Note that without the contribution premise, we have no 
way of accounting for why we need the inclusion of all affected to 
know and understand the interests of all affected. For example, one 
might reject the epistemic principle of inclusion because some 
participants are just not very good at giving reasons or because 
their worldview is so unreasonable that it is easily trumped by 
other arguments.
5 Alongside inclusion, constructivists also require further epistemic 
conditions such as truthfulness on the part of those who speak and equal 
opportunities to make relevant contributions. See footnote 3.
6 Note that Martí’s (2006) overview of epistemic conceptions of delibera-
tive democracy distinguishes between constructivist and realist 
conceptions. Realist epistemic conceptions take the view that the right 
answer to political judgments lies “outside” of, or independent of, 
deliberation. The greater our inclusion, the more likely it will be that we 
find this answer. Constructivist epistemic conceptions take the rightness 
of norms or political judgments are internal to, or dependent on, 
deliberation. Another way to put this is the independence of a political 
judgement relies on the fulfilment of certain deliberative conditions. My 
view is that realist conceptions are inappropriate to questions of justice 
or political decision- making understood broadly. A political decision is 
of high epistemic quality when it is justified in terms that are convincing 
from the standpoint of all deliberators. But this means that if a compe-
tent deliberator is sincerely unconvinced by the merits of a norm or 
decision, his or her dissent signals that the community’s consensus may 
not be as well justified as believed. But on realist accounts, this is not the 
case. Once we “find” the “real” political principle, it is easier to discount 
dissenting views, even when citizens are sincerely unconvinced of the 
merits of the principle, by saying that they are simply mistaken. So,  
the realist view has some potentially undemocratic implications (as 
described in Peter, 2008).
The belief motivating this objection is that the contribution 
premise is stated too strongly: The idea that everyone’s participa-
tion is epistemically helpful is simply an overstatement, because we 
know from experience that some people in fact do not make 
relevant contributions to deliberation. However, this objection 
trades on an ambiguity about what means to exclude in the 
epistemic sense. To exclude means to keep something out. To 
exclude in the epistemic sense means to keep an argument or 
perspective out of deliberation. Deciding that you have nothing to 
say is a form of epistemic exclusion. But it does not follow that, if 
included in deliberation, any of the positions you advance about a 
certain issue will carry the day. The development of the best 
available argument is what deliberation is about, on an epistemic 
view, and this requires claims to be assessed for their merits. But 
even then, arguments found to be wanting are still epistemically 
valuable. For example, unconvincing but well- crafted and well- 
intended arguments can shape our collective knowledge and 
understanding of a political norm or decision by refining our  
sense of what is justifiable and what is not, or by sensitizing us to 
points of view we had not considered fully beforehand. These 
“failed” arguments can serve as bridges to more successful ones.
Therefore, we can justify an epistemic principle of inclusion 
supported by the contribution premise without denying that 
deliberative ability varies across individuals and groups. All that 
variability tells us is that once included, some arguments will be 
articulated with more skill by some than by others. But all such 
arguments are more likely to make a contribution if they are 
included than excluded. We have no epistemic reason to assume in 
advance of a deliberation which arguments are likely to be success-
ful in shaping the political norm or decision in question. And only 
if we were to accept the idea that all arguments and claims have 
equal epistemic weight would we have to conclude that the 
variability of deliberative competence necessarily leads to exclu-
sion, for it would mean that convincing (or failing to convince) 
could only be attributed to deliberative skill and not the epistemic 
quality or importance of the arguments being made.
Epistemic inclusion means that we must accord presumptive 
epistemic value to the reasons that our fellow citizens offer in 
practical discourse, giving them time and opportunity to test those 
reasons against other arguments and points of view. To do other-
wise would be an act of exclusion, and an epistemically bad act at 
that. But what about children? Everything turns on whether we 
should accord this presumption to children, and a plausible 
argument can indeed be made for jettisoning the contribution 
premise in their case. This is because an argument from circum-
spection could be used to advance the view that children’s political 
inclusion will, all things considered, extract an epistemic cost on 
deliberation, a cost high enough to undermine the epistemic point 
and purpose of inclusion.
Here is how: In a deliberative democracy, we usually cannot 
presume to know who the knowers are, or even what counts as a 
good knower, with respect to various political questions. This is 
why it would be a mistake to exclude individuals or groups from 
deliberation in advance. But the argument from circumspection 
claims that children are different. They may state reasons 
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capriciously. They may leave other deliberators uncertain as to 
whether their reasons accurately reflect their preferences or 
interests. They may unwittingly amplify a political point of view 
whose implications they do not, and cannot, fully understand. 
Their own developing views may come to be unduly (even if 
unintentionally) shaped by persuasive deliberators before they 
have acquired the ability to critically reflect on, and revise, such 
views.
All this is to say that an argument from circumspection claims 
that children represent the one and only group for whom we say, 
“We know that they do not know.” No generalization to other adults 
follows from this claim, because while it concedes that we cannot 
know with reasonable certainty that other adults do not know (the 
contribution premise holds), we can know with reasonable 
certainty that children do not know (the contribution premise 
fails). In other words, the inclusion of children carries an epistemic 
cost that we can reasonably anticipate before deliberation, which in 
turn supplies citizens with reasonable grounds for excluding them 
from public deliberation altogether.7
Should deliberative democrats be convinced by the argument 
from circumspection? There are some strongly intuitive grounds 
for deliberative communities to approach the inclusion of children 
with caution. These intuitions may reflect a pretheoretical under-
standing of the epistemic value of deliberating with others. Yet 
there also seems to be some equally strong reasons, as expressed  
by the epistemic principle of political inclusion, for ensuring that 
they are included. Philosophers sympathetic with the deliberative 
democratic ideal, especially those who recognize deliberation’s 
epistemic value, should address this issue head on if they wish to 
fully articulate deliberative democracy as a political framework. 
Therefore, in what follows, I look at several arguments for chil-
dren’s deliberative inclusion and assess the extent to which they can 
plausibly reconcile this tension. I then reconstruct the relevant 
features of these arguments to present an account of my own.
7 Why not assess children’s capacity to contribute on a case- by- case basis? 
First, it isn’t clear what specific competences would warrant some 
children to be included over others. Second, if we were to specify them, 
we would reintroduce the generalization problem by at the same time 
proffering an argument for the exclusion of relevantly similar adults. 
Finally, there is also the question of justice. That is, it’s quite likely that 
the criteria we use to make case by case judgements about children’s 
deliberative competence would arbitrarily favor children who have 
received various social, economic or other advantages that make it easier 
for them to signal such competence. This could result in a deliberative 
community in which the interests of well- off children have greater 
epistemic authority than those of other children, which, in turn, would 
undermine the epistemic quality of the deliberation. For an analysis of 
citizenship tests and “case- by- case” approaches to democratic inclusion 
from the standpoint of political justice and fairness, see Fowler (2014, 
p. 101– 104). For an analysis of the role of education in addressing 
inequalities in deliberative competence on epistemic grounds, see 
(Martin, 2016).
Deliberative Inclusion and Children in Political Philosophy
The Argument from Children’s Distinctiveness
Can the argument from circumspection be decisively defeated? 
One could start from the view that children are not only an 
independent source of reasons about justice that we need to hear 
from but also a distinctive source of reasons. On this view of 
deliberation, “childhood” represents a singular social or cultural 
perspective— a separate and valuable state— on par with other 
ways of life. Kulynych (2001), for example, claims that our political 
culture fails to adequately include the distinctive social perspective 
of children within the deliberative public sphere. The ideals of 
adulthood and maturity have together reinforced the view that 
children are the “disorderly outsiders” of deliberation in a way that 
impoverishes, as it were, the child’s own point of view.
Here, the exclusion of children from the public sphere 
constitutes a fundamental epistemic loss to the extent that our 
norms of justice, as well as the political decisions derived from 
them, will always be prone to error when an entire social group is 
excluded. Part of the argument’s appeal here is that, if sound, we 
would have an overriding epistemic reason for the inclusion of 
children. This is because even if the inclusion of children has 
epistemic costs, these costs are actually quite negligible relative to 
exclusion because no conception of justice could be epistemically 
successful without a “child’s perspective” coming to inform it.
Is this a plausible view? First, while it is true that children  
have distinctive interests from those of adults, it does not follow 
that these distinctive interests are bound to their stage of life or that 
their exclusion is a fundamental epistemic error. For example, 
children’s interests can be forward- looking, such as an interest in 
becoming an autonomous person. These interests often trump 
children’s short- term interests. Second, even if we conceded  
that childhood represented a singular social perspective it is an 
ephemeral one. Children may have interests that only come with 
being a child, but they will not have these interests for very long, 
relatively speaking. Both observations rule against the account’s 
plausibility because they prevent us from fully explaining away 
some persistent intuitions about how we should treat children, 
intuitions that the argument from children’s distinctiveness would 
have us drop. For example, we can acknowledge that children exist 
in a distinctive “life- world” in which certain interests, values and 
preferences have their own currency. But this does not give us any 
reason for withholding our circumspection. If anything, the 
would- be distinctiveness of the child’s world may give us addi-
tional reasons to be circumspect and exclude them from discourse 
because their own “all things considered” interests may be dis-
torted by the immediate and idiosyncratic nature of the distinctive 
world in which they reside. It therefore seems that the claim that 
children are distinctive can cut either way: toward exclusion or 
toward inclusion.
The Argument from Public Understanding
It is plausible to think that children have some interests that are 
distinctive to their stage of life but just as plausible to claim that 
adults should make sure that these distinct interests do not 
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compromise the child’s long- term interests. However, another 
argument for why inclusion should trump circumspection  
could be that justification to children in deliberation has epistemic 
benefits that trump the cost of their inclusion. Beckman (2008), for 
example, interprets Rawls’s (1996) liberal principle of legitimacy to 
mean that the basic structure of society must be justified to all 
persons, including children. Accordingly, Beckman proposes an 
“adults as children” conception of trustee justification where 
deliberants imaginatively enter into the child’s perspective and ask 
what they would want as children were they rational or reasonable 
(p. 150). Initially, trustee justification might suggest that children 
are not granted the epistemic presumption because adults  
are doing all the cognitive work. But Beckman distinguishes here 
between the acceptability of principles of justice by reasonable 
persons and the public understanding of principles of justice by all 
(p. 149). Children are not often reasonable and as such are not 
party to the rejection or acceptance of principles of justice— they 
need trustees to do that. But he further argues that political 
legitimacy requires that principles of justice be understood by both 
the reasonable and unreasonable alike, and this includes children 
(p. 143). Accordingly, Beckman claims that:
[e]ffective communication with children is likely to bring along more 
sensitivity to children’s viewpoints and interests. Anyone involved  
in the task of explaining to the child what justice requires, what rights 
they should and should not have, will want the reasons to appear as 
reasonable. In anticipating the child’s objections to what we say, we 
will take care that we have adequately taken the child’s perspective 
into account. (p. 150)
But is this really epistemic inclusion? Anticipating the 
objections of someone we are deliberating with is not the same as 
soliciting their reasons for accepting or contesting a norm. For 
example, I may anticipate that an audience of children will object 
to my claim that they must go to school until they are of age. I may 
offer some reasons why they should be compelled to go school and 
package them in a way that makes this requirement easier for them 
to appreciate. But at no point must I take their objections seriously, 
nor do I have to alter my original justification for why they have to 
go to school. It is simply not the case that anticipating what a child 
might object to necessarily involves taking their perspective 
seriously in the epistemic sense, that is, that their point of view is a 
source of independent reasons essential to ensuring that the 
decision is of sufficient epistemic quality.
My view is that Beckman’s argument for children’s inclusion is 
political, not epistemic. Being able to account for our judgements  
is certainly part of what it means to justify something. However, 
“account for” and “justifying to” reflect weaker and stronger 
epistemic requirements. Explaining to children falls under the 
weaker sense understood by teachers: that in trying to teach 
something to someone we can discover ways to better account for, 
or communicate, that thing. That is to say, effective communica-
tion does not entail a change in the propositional content or logical 
structure of what is taught. For example, there is a difference in 
taking the child’s level of comprehension into account when 
explaining a moral principle and taking a child’s reasons into 
account when attempting to justify that same principle. The latter 
involves an epistemic presumption while the former does not. 
With communicability and greater understanding comes legiti-
macy and political stability but not necessarily greater epistemic 
quality.
The Argument from Nondomination
Another argument for why deliberative inclusion should trump 
circumspection is that it is a necessary condition of political 
freedom. The argument from public understanding saw the 
communication of principles of justice to citizens as a condition of 
political legitimacy. On the view I explore here, a political authority 
must know and understand the interests of those it exercises 
authority over and be moved by that knowledge and understand-
ing in ways that help those citizens, if that exercise is to be legiti-
mate. For example, Bohman (2011) has argued that children, like 
any citizen, should be protected from domination by the state 
(p. 135; Pettit, 1997). However, the state can only avoid dominating 
children when it is able to track their opinions and interests 
(Bohman, 2011, p. 135). The problem is how to ensure that such 
tracking is accurate. This is where the epistemic angle on delibera-
tion becomes important. For while we might think that parents 
and other trustees should do the tracking, a paternalistic treatment 
of those interests may lead to misinterpretations or misunder-
standings that lead to bad policies.8
Bohman (2011) thinks that this is serious enough a problem to 
justify extending the rights of communicative freedom to children. 
As he put it:
[communicative rights] provides a standing on which a child or others 
without [full legal status] become “self- originating source of claims” 
(Rawls, 1996, 509) . . . recognition of a shared communicative status in 
the public sphere is cosmopolitan in the sense that it is not derived 
from some other membership but rather from mutually granted . . . 
communicative freedom of addressing others and being addressed by 
them. (p. 136)
For Bohman (2011), communicative freedom is fundamental 
to protecting children from domination by state power by ensuring 
that their independent, or self- originating, opinions and interests 
can circulate (and be tracked) within the public sphere.
One appealing feature of Bohman’s (2011) account is that it 
offers normative reasons why children’s opinions and interests have 
epistemic value in democratic deliberation: Knowing and 
8 On this account, domination occurs when the state exercises its 
authority over others (such as children) without taking seriously their 
interests. But nondomination does not mean that the state should only 
account for the expressed interests of children. For example, compulsory 
schooling is often justified on the grounds that children have an interest 
in receiving an education, even if they do not understand this interest. 
However, we can use the concept of nondomination in order make a 
distinction between a state that uses the compulsory argument to engage 
in domination and one that does not. For example, perhaps in the 
former case, the state refuses to consider the opinions and interests that 
children have about their own education and in all cases imposes a 
particular view of what a good education should look like, while in the 
former the state is willing to hear out children’s points of view.
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understanding these opinions and interests are necessary to avoid 
domination.
But is this argument strong enough to defeat circumspection? 
The argument against circumspection is that children are entitled 
to the presumption that their claims have epistemic value even  
if their inclusion involves some other epistemic costs. But it is not 
clear what this argument means at the level of deliberative practice. 
Bohman’s (2011) central claim is that knowing and understanding 
children’s opinions and interests are necessary to avoid domina-
tion. But the path from knowing about children’s beliefs and 
opinions to policies that avoid nondomination can be formulated 
in either a weak or strong epistemic sense, each with different 
implications for our deliberative practices.
Understood in the weak sense, the epistemic value of chil-
dren’s communicative freedom is because its exercise supplies the 
public sphere with information about what children happen to 
value and believe. This information can be useful in developing 
effective policies. For example, knowing what children believe and 
value can be used to identify incentives that make it easier for 
political communities to achieve their goals. But there is no sense 
in which what children claim could, by itself, shift those goals. 
Treating children as a source of information to refine our own 
beliefs about what is just does not require us to see children as an 
independent source of beliefs about what is just or fair (see Craig, 
1990, p. 43). The weaker version therefore seems insufficient to 
defeat circumspection.
Understood in the strong sense, children’s communicative 
freedom empowers children to make claims in the public sphere 
that reflect needs and interests that the state should take as 
seriously as any other claim from any other constituency. This  
does appear to defeat circumspection, because without their 
inclusion, the political community has no way of being certain that 
it’s decisions are nondominating (even if their participation has 
other epistemic costs).
However, this argument does not leave the deliberative 
relationship between adults and children entirely symmetrical. 
This is because we can distinguish between individuals as self- 
originating, or independent, sources of claims about justice, and 
being reliable, valid, or credible sources of such claims. An adult 
deliberator can believe that children should be included for 
epistemic reasons while at the same time believing that they are less 
reliable than adults in terms of what they claim to know. There is no 
inherent contradiction in holding to both beliefs. What arises from 
them is an understanding about one’s deliberative practice, that is, 
that children should be included but that their discursive claims 
are to be treated judiciously and carefully.
In fact, circumspection provides reasonable grounds for 
thinking that asymmetry between adults and children within 
deliberation is necessary for securing children’s non- domination. 
In recognizing children’s claims about justice as independent, 
responsible deliberators should carefully weigh the consequences 
of those claims for the long- term interests of children even when 
those claims sound convincing or persuasive. Circumspection 
reminds us that we should engage with children’s beliefs and 
opinions on what is just and fair with a sense of paternal 
responsibility. We need to track the opinions and interests of 
children accurately, and this requires their inclusion. But accuracy 
is not the same as validity. Adults have reason to take children 
seriously as an independent source of claims about justice and 
fairness, but they also have reason to hold such claims to greater 
scrutiny and be more cautious in drawing conclusions about what 
these claims mean for policy. Further, adults should be careful to 
scale their degree of circumspection (and paternalism) depending 
on the child’s cognitive, affective, and conative abilities.
Epistemic Inclusion and the Aims of Schooling
I conclude that deliberative democrats should extend epistemic 
inclusion to children and, in so doing, treat them as an indepen-
dent source of claims about what is just and fair. Once included, 
adult deliberators have a responsibility to practice circumspection 
about the claims children make as befits their degree of deliberative 
competence. This is because they have reasonable grounds for 
anticipating that such claims are less likely to be reliable, all things 
considered. It seems to me that this tension is not something that 
should be troubling for deliberative democrats, because it 
acknowledges that all points of view can make an epistemic 
contribution without requiring us to abdicate our responsibilities 
to children, responsibilities that continue to hold within delibera-
tion. The mistake lies in concluding that the epistemic value of 
deliberative democracy commits us either to the view that chil-
dren’s relative unreliability as a source of independent claims 
justifies their exclusion from the deliberative public sphere 
altogether, or that our intuitions about their vulnerability are 
oppressive and unjustly paternal. We can take some solace in  
the idea that that seeing children as an independent source  
of reasons about justice, as opposed to being merely a source of 
information, entails a serious shift in how we should understand 
deliberative democracy as a political framework even when this 
shift is somewhat tempered by adult circumspection.
To show how, I want to focus on an implication of my 
argument for how the role of schools should be understood within 
deliberative democracy. Consider first that despite the account of 
children’s inclusion proffered above, there remains a real possibility 
that circumspection opens children up to a different form of 
domination. Fricker’s (2007) account of epistemic injustice has 
highlighted how minorities and other marginalized groups 
experience prejudice in their status as “knowers.” These forms of 
prejudice either dismiss a person’s testimony about what they 
believe to be the case or have the effect of undermining a discrimi-
nated groups’ ability to trust in, and articulate, their own views and 
experiences. Fricker’s work has provoked a widespread reassess-
ment of knowledge practices in a variety of domains, including the 
relationship between political authority and deliberative democ-
racy, where she argues that within the deliberative democratic 
context, citizens should be able to successfully contest or justify 
norms and policies (2013). The conditions she sees as necessary for 
the possibility of deliberative success are already familiar to 
deliberative democrats: open procedures, the representation of all 
affected in those procedures, and institutions that enable such 
contestation (Fricker, 2013, p. 1323). However, she also advances 
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epistemic justice as an additional necessary condition (Fricker, 
2013, p. 1323). As she put it:
[d]uring the debate- like exchange that constitutes the contestation the 
citizen . . . must be subject neither to testimonial injustice, nor to 
hermenutical injustice in respect of what she needs to communicate. 
Epistemic justice of these two anti- discriminatory kinds are 
requirements for contestation, because if the citizen suffers an unjust 
deficit either of credibility or of intelligibility, then s/he precisely 
cannot get a fair hearing that contestation requires. (Fricker, 2013, 
p. 1324)
We can easily make the connection to children’s inclusion, for 
while we may see children as an independent source of reasons, the 
concern here is that being circumspect about those reasons because 
they are children is unfairly prejudicial about their status as 
knowers. If true, circumspection opens the door to treating 
children within deliberation in ways that, individually or structur-
ally, prevents them for articulating or contesting norms or prin-
ciples to the best of their ability.
How do we know when circumspection is justified and when 
it represents mere discrimination? Circumspection is different 
from discrimination when the reasons for being circumspect are 
not arbitrary, and our reasons for being circumspect about 
children’s claims are not arbitrary because we have good reasons 
for believing that children are relatively inexperienced knowers on 
matters of justice and fairness, and for this reason prone to error. 
However, I believe that Fricker’s epistemic justice condition places 
on obligation on adult deliberators even when circumspection is 
justified. A deliberative community also has an obligation to avoid 
what I call formative epistemic injustice: treatment that under-
mines the development of competences necessary for individuals 
and groups to successfully contest norms and policies within 
deliberation. Examples of such treatment within the deliberative 
context could involve an unwillingness on the part of adult 
deliberators to help children articulate or make sense of their 
interests and experiences, or to treat children’s claims merely as a 
source of information, or to take a dismissive or condescending 
attitude to their independent claims. These deliberative practices 
go beyond by exhibiting mere caution by denying the child the 
experience of being treated as a reliable knower simply because of 
their relative lack of experience.
What is the harm in such treatment? The experience of being 
recognized as a reliable knower, even when one is not, plays a role 
in the development of one’s agency as deliberator. Accordingly, 
being systematically denied such experiences undermines the 
development of one’s deliberative agency and competence. Note 
that epistemic injustice can obtain even when the individual or 
group in question lacks full credibility as a knower. The injustice in 
question is not so much a form of discrimination as the denial of an 
educational opportunity that should be valued highly within a 
deliberative political framework. Consider further that Fricker 
argues that epistemic injustice should not happen “during the 
debate” (Fricker, 2013, p. 1324). But from a formative point of view, 
the absence of discrimination is a necessary, but not sufficient, 
condition for securing epistemic justice. This is because even 
though it is permissible to be circumspect about the epistemic 
value of children’s claims as befits their competence, circumspec-
tion writ large across the deliberative community may nonetheless 
inhibit the development of those habits of mind and conceptual 
resources needed for the successful contestation of norms. 
Therefore, while we have reason to be circumspect about children’s 
independent beliefs and opinions, formative epistemic justice 
suggests that we also have good reasons to treat the expression and 
articulation of beliefs and opinions about what is just and fair with 
greater care and discernment than competence warrants on its 
own. Balancing between these requires discernment on the part  
of adult deliberators and depends on the deliberative compe-
tence of the particular child or adolescent and the kind of claim 
they are making.
The key question is how general the problem of formative 
epistemic justice is for deliberative democracy, and this is where 
the epistemic costs of inclusion come back into the picture. It 
would be unreasonable, I think, to require every adult deliberator 
to check his or her circumspection simply to support an important 
educational project— the development of a future citizen’s ability to 
deliberate. But when we move from deliberative democracy 
understood in the abstract to the design of our deliberative 
democratic institutions, the importance of formative epistemic 
justice becomes more salient.
Some institutions bear a greater responsibility for the support 
of educational values than others, with schools being especially 
important. The conventional view, I take it, is that if deliberative 
democracy is a desirable political conception, schools should see 
an education for such a conception to be one of their central aims 
(Samuelsson, 2016).9 Schools should aim to ensure that children 
learn the skills, habits and values that will enable them to exercise 
their communicative rights as adults. However, formative epis-
temic justice shifts this account in an important way. Now we have 
a school in which children are being prepared for a deliberative 
democratic order partly through the experience of being taken 
seriously as an equal epistemic member of a deliberative commu-
nity. The picture here is of an institution that at the right times, and 
for the right reasons, checks circumspection to provide children 
with important formative experiences relating to being treated as 
an independent and credible source of reasons. Note further that 
when children are included in deliberation, checking circumspec-
tion incidentally increases the likelihood such children will make 
valuable epistemic contributions to political decision- making. In 
being more charitable, for example, schools may be surprised to 
discover an independent point of view that was not fully appreci-
ated beforehand, potentially reshaping our public knowledge and 
understanding of justice in turn.
These considerations place schools in an interesting position. 
If schools ignored such discoveries, they would arguably be at a 
double deliberative fault: First, their deliberative engagements with 
children would be in bad faith in the sense that they would be 
merely giving the outward appearance of treating children as full 
9 For more on the role of deliberation in schools, see Englund (2009), 
Okshevsky (2004), and Sprod (2003).
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epistemic agents to secure an educational benefit. Further, they 
would be putting children at greater risk of domination by the state 
because they would be knowingly omitting perspectives and 
arguments that have the potential to shape how the public sphere 
understands questions of justice and fairness.
The way to get around these faults is to understand that, 
within the deliberative democratic framework, schools ought also 
to play a communicative role, mediating between the independent 
claims that children make, circumspection about those claims, and 
the public sphere. Schools should not only help deliberative 
communities track the interests of children but facilitate the 
epistemic value of the claims children make about their interests by 
helping them interpret and articulate those claims in ways that 
strengthens the public intelligibility, reliability or credibility. It 
would be costly for a deliberative community in general to  
work this way, but schools can play this distinctive role within  
the deliberative framework.
I have argued that the epistemic and educational value of 
democratic deliberation are related in a way that establishes a 
distinct role for schools. One important objection is that this role is 
assigned based on the fact children happen to go to schools, but 
nothing about my argument shows why facilitating the public 
communication of children’s independent views is something that 
should fall within the aims of schooling. I don’t think that this is 
really a problem, because schools always have to negotiate the 
various educational, social, and economic aims at play within 
whatever political framework they may find themselves situated 
within, and within a deliberative political framework it would not 
be implausible to think that one of those aims would be the 
promotion of communication between those that attend school 
and the public sphere. More troublesome is the possibility that 
restricting this communicative role to the school risks limiting our 
serious treatment of children’s beliefs and opinions to their beliefs 
and opinions about the institution in which they are happen to be 
treated as full epistemic agents, which just is the world of school-
ing. If the only institutional space in which children are treated as 
full epistemic agents is the school, it may be that the only opinions 
and beliefs we will hear much from children about is the world of 
schooling. This is an objection worth taking seriously, and I have 
two replies that I think mitigate this concern.
First, note that on my account, children should play a 
deliberative role in decision- making bodies other than schools, 
even when circumspection applies to them. Children are granted 
communicative rights that should be secured and exercised in a 
variety of institutions on a range of issues, such as health care, law, 
and government itself. Second, we should think of schools in the 
deliberative political framework serving not merely a communica-
tive function but as subject to communicative obligations. An 
analogy drawn from the moral and legal duty for teachers report 
child neglect might be helpful in explaining the distinction. When 
teachers hear things from students about their lives outside of the 
school that call into question the student’s safety and well- being, 
teachers have a moral and legal obligation to report. Similarly, I 
think, when schools encounter beliefs and opinions that bear 
importantly on children’s lives in school or outside, schools have an 
obligation to help communicate those beliefs and opinions to the 
public sphere. Schools in their communicative role should 
facilitate children’s independent claims not only about the justice 
of their life in schools but about issues of justice and fairness that 
they care about in general.
These and other features of communicative schools need to be 
unpacked in more detail. What should teaching and learning look 
like, and how should teachers and students navigate challenges that 
the public sphere itself faces, such as political polarization and 
group bias? I think we have the theoretical and conceptual tools 
needed to answer these questions. But they require imaginative 
uptake from others interested in the deliberative democratic 
project. Some of those others could and should, I think, include 
“nonvoting minors” themselves.
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